Introduction Introduction the essential, structure. The addition or deletion of major states, however, is certain to have a substantial impact on both the distribution of power and e pattern of amity and enmity. At the bottom end lies the domestic security environment of individual states and societies. Next come the regional security complexes.
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Introduction Introduction the essential, structure. The addition or deletion of major states, however, is certain to have a substantial impact on both the distribution of power and e pattern of amity and enmity. At the bottom end lies the domestic security environment of individual states and societies. Next come the regional security complexes. Thus relations among security complexes also comprise a layer within the framework, one that becomes important if major changes in thefcfjattem of security complexes are underway.
One would expect security relations among the great powers to be intense and to penetrate in varying degrees -into the affairs of the local complexes. Asia -M, a clear example of a security complex centered on the rivalry between India and Pakistan, with Burma acting as the border with the complex in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan delineating the border with the Middle East complex, and China looming as an intervening great power. One value of classical security complex theory is that it draws attention away from the extremes of national and global security and focuses it on the region, where these two extremes interplapand where most of the action occurs.
The theory offers descriptive concepts for both static and dynamic analysis and provides benchmarks for locating significant change within the structure of international security relations. Security regions therefore had the following characteristics: B p l They were composed of two or more states. The pattern of security interdependence had to be deep and durable i. In other words, security regions were a type of international political subsystem and were relatively autonomous microversions of the larger international political system within which they were embedded.
Because the units of analysis were states, security regions tended to be a fairly large- 16 Introduction Introduction scale phenomenon. To what extent are regional patterns discernible when one no longer sticks to the state and privileges the political and military sectors?
Will the security dynamics in the nontraditional sectors generate significant regional formations, or will their security logics place their main focus on higher system or lower subunit levels?
Will the other sectors show dynamics that are mainly global, mainly local, a mess, or what? The answers to these questions will hinge on whether the relevant units are fixed or mobile and on whether threats and vulnerabilities are strongly shaped by distance.
If units are not fixed or if threats are not shaped by distance, regionalizing logic may be weak. Will environmental sectors cluster, for example, around seas the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Sea of Japan, and so on and rivers the Nile, Euphrates, and Jordan , whereas the political and societal sectors will be mainly land-based and continental?
Discovering the answers to these questions is the work of Chapters 3 through 7, and putting the findings together is that of Chapter 8. Logically, there are two possible ways of opening security complex theory to sectors other than the military-political and to actors other than states: a single frame and also to keep track of the inevitable spillovers between sectors military impacts on economic developments and the like.
Homogeneous, or sector-specific, security complexes which would include the classical political-military, state-dominated model require the construction of separate frames for each sector. They offer the possibility of isolating sector-specific security dynamics politico-military, economic, societal, and so forth , but they also present the challenge of how to reassemble the separate frames into a holistic picture and the danger that linkages across sectors will be lost or obscured. In the chapters that follow, we take the sector-by-sector approach on the grounds that we need to explore the as yet poorly understood security dynamics of sectors and because it seems to be the best way to set out the framework.
This should not be read as privileging the homogeneous approach over the heterogeneous one, as becomes apparent in Chapter 8. Each of the sector chapters contains a subsection that asks, where are the security dynamics of this sector predominantly located, and what are the trends?
Are they regional, global, or maybe local? Second is the process of securitization itself. Facilitating conditions are sometimes clearly located on a level and sometimes not. Issues are clearly global when they have global causes and effects—for example, planetary temperature change, sea-level rises, and the like. They are local when they have local causes and effects—for example, pollution of water by industrial waste or sewage discharge. Water pollution may occur in many places worldwide, but that does not make it a globallevel issue in the sense we use that term here but rather a case of parallel local issues.
The difference is not whether pollution is felt locally—sealevel rises are too—but that one case could take place without the other. Rising sea level, in contrast, is an integrated phenomenon; it is impossible for it to rise in one region and not in another.
But in principle its causes could be local, caused, for example, by energy consumption in one country. It is possible to mix levels and have, for example, local causes and global effects the earlier example or global causes and local effects such us holes in the ozone layer. This situation, however, is all about the level of the issue, not necessarily of its securitization. As in classical security complex theory, the more important criterion is which actors are actually K Homogeneous complexes.
Heterogeneous complexes. This approach abandons the assumption that security complexes are locked into specific sectors. It assumes that the regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting across two or more sectors e. There is no reason to choose between these alternatives. In principle, both are possible, and the analyst needs to determine which alternative best fits the case under study. Heterogeneous security complexes have the advantage of linking actors across sectors, thus enabling the analyst to keep the entire picture in 18 Introduction linked by their mutual security concerns.
More generally in this investigation, the criterion for answering the levels question is ultimately political: what constellation of actors forms on this issue. In the process of securitization, the key issue is for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom. Upstream and downstream powers and other potential beneficiaries from a particular river or lake will see each other as both threats and potential allies, which might play into other rivalries and constellations in the region and thus become tied into a more general regional security complex.
This result is not determined purely by the nature of the issue: If all downstream nations could join together and push for global regulations on water usage, they could securitize the issue at the global level.
Because we opt for the homogeneous, sector-specific approach in Chapters 3 through 7, there is a problem in pinning down the meaning of region and, more generally, of levels. In line with the scheme presented in the section Levels of Analysis, we would have preferred to think of regions and units in terms appropriate to specific sectors. Thereby, we achieve consistency in the meaning of region by using the political, state-defined sense of the term as a standard measure no matter which sector we are discussing.
We do this not to determine or privilege the state as an actor but merely to achieve consistency in discussions. Other units exist, but only one is chosen as the instrument of measurement. Thus, by region we mean a spatially coherent territory composed of Introduction 19 two or more states. Subregion means part of such a region, whether it involves more than one state but fewer than all of the states in the region or some transnational composition some mix of states, parts of states, or both.
Microregion refers to the subunit level within the boundaries of a state. The; second way in which we move beyond CSCT is by taking an explicitly social constructivist approach to understanding the process by which issues become securitized. That approach is the subject of Chapter 2, which makes the case for understanding security not just as the use of force but as a particular type of intersubjective politics. Chapter 2 attempts to clarify two analytical issues: 1 how to identify what is and what is not a security issue, or, put another way, how to differentiate between the politicization and the securitization of an issue; and 2 how to identify and distinguish security actors and referent objects.
Each of Chapters 3 through 7 covers one of the principal sectors that define the attempt to construct a broader agenda for international security studies. Each of these chapters is a lens that isolates a specific sector for analytical purposes and tries to uncover its distinctive security dynamics. Chapter 8 attempts the reaggregation, first in terms of how the security dynamics in the five sectors align with each other but mainly in terms of Ihe reintegration of sectors by actors in the policymaking process.
Chapter 9 reflects on the approach used to pull security studies into a coherent framework, compares the new framework with the traditional one, and looks at implications for security complex theory. More on critical security studies in Chapter 2. We are aware that in some other literatures the term region has a different meaning from ours. The term was originally introduced at the subunit level.
This politicized notion of the region lives on in separatist movements. Also, contemporary journals like Regional Politics and Policy published since , International Regional Science Review since , Journal of Regional Science since , and Regional Studies since are devoted primarily to the situation of ethnic minorities in specific subunit regions and to issues of administration and planning at different political levels— that is, political centralization and decentralization.
Joeimiemi , Since we argue that security is not an objective issue but a product of the behavior of actors, security complexes are not objective in the"traditional sense. Nor is the security complex to be seen as a discursive construction by the actors. We are not in this context interested in whether the actors define themselves as a region or whether they claim that their true region is something larger or smaller.
Security complexes do not require that their members think in terms of the concept security complex cf. Analysts apply the term security complex and therefore designate a region based upon the contingent, historically specific, and possibly changing constellation generated by the interdependent security practices of the actors.
On this basis, lines can be drawn on a map, and the theory can be put into operation. What quality makes something a security issue in international relations? Unlike soeial security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics. In this context, security is about survival. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.
When we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms existential threat and emergency measures mean? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question. The essential quality of existence will vary greatly 22 Security Analysis across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats.
In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state, although it may also be other kinds of political entities. It is also possible to imagine circumstances in which threats to the survival of the armed forces would elevate those forces to referent object status in their own right, perhaps serving to justify a coup against the existing government and its policy whether of disarmament or of hopeless conflict.
For many of the advanced democracies, defense of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces.
Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority. Among the ever more interdependent and institutionalized relations characteristic of the West and increasingly of the international system as a whole , a variety of supranational referent objects are also becoming important. The European Union EU can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process.
In the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down. In the societal sector, as we have defined it, the referent object is largescale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as Security Analysis 23 nations and religions. Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments.
In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is very large, ranging from relatively concrete things, such as the survival of individual species tigers, whales, humankind or types of habitat rain forests, lakes , to much fuzzier, larger-scale issues, such as maintenance of the planetary climate and biosphere within the narrow band human beings have come to consider to be normal during their few thousand years of civilization.
The interplay among all of these factors is immensely complicated. At either the macro or the micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat the survival of species, the survival of human civilization that can be securitized. In between, somewhat as in Ihe economic sector, lies a huge mass of problems that are more difficult, although not impossible, to construct in existential terms. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.
In the case of issues notably the environment that have moved dramatically out of the nonpoliticized category, we face the double question of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized. As will be seen later, it is possible for other social entities to raise an issue to the level of general consideration or even to the status of sanctioned urgency among themselves.
This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat.
Buzan, Barry - Security_ a New Framework for Analysis
Start your review of Security Write a review Apr 14, Richard rated it really liked it Recommends it for: Social science academics and theorists Shelves: edu-international-relations , social-political , nonfiction , at-sfsu , read-these-reviews-first Security: A New Framework for Analysis is a very important book in many schools of the social sciences, even if its origins lie in international relations. The securitization that it defines has become, through several evolutions, one of the dominant lenses through which security and insecurity are studied. Security and insecurity have a lot of meanings, but one easy way to think of this is that the feeling of security means one perceives no threats. So security studies are an examination of Security: A New Framework for Analysis is a very important book in many schools of the social sciences, even if its origins lie in international relations. So security studies are an examination of what is threatened, and by whom.
This book sets out janew and comprehensive framework of analysis for security studies. Establishing the ease for the wider agenda, it both answer the traditionalist charge that the wider agenda makes the subject incoherent and formulates security to incorporate the traditionalist agenda. It rejects the traditional ists case for restricting security to one sector, arguing that security is a par ticular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. And it offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securiti zation from that of politicizationfor understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions. The original motive for the book was to update regional security com plex theory Buza 19telMBuzan at al.